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Abstract—Journalists have long been the targets of both
physical and cyber-attacks from well-resourced adversaries.
Internet of Things (IoT) devices are arguably a new avenue
of threat towards journalists through both targeted and
generalised cyber-physical exploitation. This study comprises
three parts: First, we interviewed 11 journalists and surveyed
5 further journalists, to determine the extent to which
journalists perceive threats through the IoT, particularly
via consumer IoT devices. Second, we surveyed 34 cyber
security experts to establish if and how lay-people can
combat IoT threats. Third, we compared these findings to
assess journalists’ knowledge of threats, and whether their
protective mechanisms would be effective against experts’
depictions and predictions of IoT threats. Our results indi-
cate that journalists generally are unaware of IoT-related
risks and are not adequately protecting themselves; this
considers cases where they possess IoT devices, or where
they enter IoT-enabled environments (e.g., at work or home).
Expert recommendations spanned both immediate and long-
term mitigation methods, including practical actions that are
technical and socio-political in nature. However, all proposed
individual mitigation methods are likely to be short-term
solutions, with 26 of 34 (76.5%) of cyber security experts
responding that within the next five years it will not be
possible for the public to opt-out of interaction with the IoT.
Index Terms—journalism, internet of things, smart devices,
anticipatory threat models, security, privacy, data protection
1. Introduction and Background
The seemingly unlimited growth of the global tech-
nology industry is matched by a concerning expansion of
users’ attack surfaces. Mass manufacturing of hardware
and software that can be rushed to market to meet the de-
mand for cheap products has resulted in a deluge of tech-
nologies that are intended to increase user convenience,
without maintaining a minimum standard of security. In
recent years, the threat landscape for even members of
the general public has been changing rapidly, particularly
with the mass proliferation of so-called “smart-” devices
forming an “Internet of Things” (IoT) [1]. More formally,
an IoT can be regarded as “a network that connects
uniquely identifiable ‘Things’ to the Internet. The ‘Things’
have sensing/actuation and potential programmability ca-
pabilities. Through the exploitation of unique identifica-
tion and sensing, information about the ‘Thing’ can be
collected and the state of the ‘Thing’ can be changed from
anywhere, anytime, by anything” [2].
Common examples of novel consumer IoT devices in-
clude voice assistants (e.g., Amazon Echo, Google Home)
and wearables (e.g., fitness trackers and smart watches).
The consumer IoT offers various benefits, but the com-
bination of common vulnerabilities and the generation of
personal user data and even bystander information, both in
terms of content and metadata, can pose threats to privacy
and security. In 2019, the BBC aired a documentary in
recognition of the importance of educating consumers
about the risks inherent in available gadgets [3]. These
were often marketed as intending to improve user security
but were, in fact, demonstrably easily compromised to
manipulate device actions and mine user information. Var-
ious organisations have acknowledged the risks of the IoT,
including the UK government, who provided mitigation
guidance for users [4], and has recently proposed laws for
manufacturers to enshrine a Code of Practice that would
make such guidance feasible [5]. Researchers have also
explored this domain in great depth highlighting a series
of complex risks and solutions [6], [7].
While these measures may be effective against in-
discriminate hackers, they are unlikely to protect indi-
viduals who are targeted, particularly by well-resourced
attackers. Journalists have long considered how best to
protect themselves, their sources (i.e., contacts who supply
information for a news story), and their work from emerg-
ing and evolving threats. Traditional strategies for privacy
and security are no longer effective against the ubiquity
of IoT devices [8], [9]. This is particularly given how
they constantly collect, transmit and store data, including
audio, visual and geolocation data that affect the physical
and informational security of journalists and their sources.
While journalists are likely aware of traditional risks
(e.g., being tracked via a mobile phone’s GPS), guid-
ance documents by well-known supporting organisations
such as the Rory Peck Trust [10] and Reporters without
Borders [11] overlook the potential for new IoT devices
(e.g., wearables) to be used to collect (for example)
scheduling, messages, geolocation and biometric data.
The UNESCO and Reporters without Borders ‘Safety
Guide for Journalists’ warns that “a smartphone can be
treacherous” [11] but does not acknowledge other internet-
connected devices. Already, instances of novel attacks on
the press include those conducted through botnets (which
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can be IoT-enabled). Examples include Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attacks on news organisations [12] and
the National Union of Journalists in the Philippines [13],
seemingly intended to censor the press by limiting the
availability and accessibility of their work.
In the research community, there are studies (e.g.,
[14]–[17]) that have assessed the threats journalists face
from conventional cyber-threats to phones, laptops and
communications channels. For instance, attacks have been
discussed on communication channels, personal devices
and email, which target journalists, their sources and em-
ployers. To address these, a range of strategies have been
proposed involving using encryption, secure or/and anony-
mous communication, multifactor authentication, and pro-
tecting device metadata. What is lacking, however, is
research into the threats journalists face from IoT devices,
particularly those that they may use, or be exposed to. This
is seriously needed given the difficulty in assessing risk
in, and developing ways to secure, these devices [9].
As the IoT features more in journalists’ daily lives
(both at home through consumer devices, and at work
in smart environments), researching its implications are
imperative. The goal of this study therefore is to evaluate
how journalists perceive and respond to the risks present
in this ubiquitous technology platform. Moreover, where
relevant, our work also provides an updated capture of
the risks and risk treatment behaviours with existing tech-
nologies; thereby adding directly to work such as [14].
Our objectives are threefold: first, through interview-
ing and surveying members of the media industry, we in-
tend to examine the extent to which journalists understand
the risks inherent in the IoT (including how the IoT might
exacerbate pre-existing threats, such as security issues
regarding remote communications methods) and to collect
information on how they attempt to combat perceived
IoT-related threats. Second, we survey cyber security ex-
perts to confirm how, if at all, lay-people (“the general
public”) can effectively protect their privacy and security
against threats through the IoT. Third, we seek to compare
and contrast the self-disclosed security behaviours of the
journalists with the expert recommendations, in order to
find out whether the journalists should maintain or could
improve their security strategies to protect against both
immediate and long-term IoT threats. We hope this study
can provide a unique insight into an understudied area of
work and motivate future contributions on the topic.
2. Research Questions and Methodology
To achieve the objectives of our research, we have
outlined the following research questions:
1) To what extent do journalists perceive threats
from the Internet of Things (IoT)?
2) What protective tools and methods do journalists
feel are currently effective in increasing their
cyber security against all perceived cyber-threats,
including any from the IoT?
3) Are the protective measures reported as in use by
journalists actually effective, when compared to
the known recommendations from contemporary
literature and experts in cyber security?
2.1. Interviews with Journalists
Based on the first two research questions, an interview
guide for participating journalist was formulated. Potential
interviewees were originally selected based on their pub-
lished work. In particular we looked for interviewees that
demonstrated an interest in, or understanding of, cyber
security or other high-risk topics which could make them
targets of cyber-attacks by well-resourced adversaries. Af-
ter selection, these individuals were contacted and asked
if they would be interested in participating in the study.
This work applied a semi-structured interview process to
guide the questioning but also to allow flexibility.
Our questions were premised on the belief that having
a heightened awareness of the risks attached to researching
high profile topics is likely to cause journalists to adopt
defensive strategies earlier than others in the industry.
Therefore, candidates were recruited initially as a purpo-
sive sample of our professional contacts and the pool of
respondents was subsequently expanded through snowball
sampling. All interviewees were chosen for their likeli-
hood of being among those who should be best versed in
the dangers of the IoT that are specific to journalism, with
the objective, if possible, of recording and proliferating
their protective procedures to guide other journalists.
All interviews were transcribed, and then analysed
using qualitative content analysis. We followed a 5-step
process [18] for abstracting qualitative interview data to
recognise and group themes across interviews. The steps
were: (1) noting the “meaning unit” (i.e., direct quote); (2)
condensing this in our own words; (3) creating a relevant
and brief “code” to label the quote; (4) grouping quotes
with similar codes into the same category to demon-
strate their factual relevance to each other in context; and
(5) clustering categories into overarching themes. These
themes would then form the basis for the primary analysis
and discussions. For these interviews and the other data
gathering methods below, ethical approval was granted by
the institutional Research Ethics Committee.
2.2. Online Survey with Journalists
An online survey was developed in collaboration with
the Association for International Broadcasting (AIB) for
journalists who declined an interview. The survey ques-
tions were formulated based on the interview questions.
Although questions mainly gathered quantitative data, the
questionnaire also included space for long-form com-
ments. The survey was sent by the AIB to a number of
their journalist contacts, regardless of demonstrated inter-
est in cyber security or the IoT, because of the prevalence
of the IoT and its propensity for collecting substantial
amounts of sensitive data. As such, the questionnaire is
intended to discover what journalists are broadly doing
to protect themselves against third-party exploitation (be
it from criminals, governments, or intelligence services)
of IoT (or, smart) devices. We analysed the data gathered
using descriptive statistics, and qualitative content analysis
similar to the interviews.
2.3. Online Survey with Cyber Security Experts
We also developed an online questionnaire aimed at
cyber security experts. This was intended to support in
answering the third research question, i.e., to evaluate the
protective tools and techniques used by journalists against
the IoT threats to which even members of the general
public would likely be exposed. All cyber security expert
respondents were either invited via academic mailing lists
or via the researchers’ social media posts, which requested
participants who were involved in cyber security.
The expert survey aimed to record three aspects: dig-
ital and physical threats associated with the use of smart
devices, whether and how they would advise members
of the public to cope with these threats, and the extent
to which members of the general public can opt-out of
the use of IoT devices now and in the future. We asked
experts for recommendations for the general public, rather
than for journalists specifically, because we wanted to
ensure that expert responses did not overlook basic threat
models that would affect everyone. This was intended to
establish a baseline of knowledge about both possible IoT
threats and proposed protective tactics more generally.
Six open-ended questions in the questionnaire collected
expert recommendations to inform individuals on how to
minimise or mitigate IoT threats.
3. Results
This section details the findings of the study. It begins
by introducing the professionals who participated and their
demographic information. We then present the range of
IoT threats and threat vectors that journalists face; thus
answering the first research question. This is followed by
an assessment and explanation of how journalists have
responded to these threats with protection strategies; this
allows us to address research question two. Lastly, we
compare journalists’ protective measures with the recom-
mendations outlined by experts as it pertains to cyber
security practices for the IoT (for research question three).
3.1. Participants
A total of 11 individuals positively responded to our
request for interview participation out of the 36 contacted.
Interviewees reported having a variety of the specialisms,
including cyber security, drug trafficking, conflicts and
defence, human rights and transnational organised crime.
All of these specialisms were considered high-risk in
terms of targeting by highly skilled state and criminal
actors. It should be noted that one participant (I10) was
not a journalist, but instead works closely with journalists
and news organisations on cyber security training and
response. Given this expertise and experience, we decided
it would be advantageous to interview this person as well.
On average, the interviews lasted for 45 minutes.
There were five respondents to the online journalist
survey; each with varied specialisms and experiences.
Table 1 and Table 2 provide basic demographic informa-
tion of interviewees and survey respondents respectively.
For our cyber security expert questionnaire, a total of 34
experts were recruited. Of these, 29 (85.3%) claimed to
have conducted research in the field of cyber security.
Due to the high-risk nature of some participants’ work,
particularly within the interviewees, more demographic
information is not divulged. Additionally, in the following
analysis of the study’s results, the gender-neutral pronoun
TABLE 1. DETAILS OF INTERVIEWEES
Interviewee Role(s) held in the media
sector
Years
working as
a, or with,
journalist(s)
I1 Journalist 6
I2 Journalist 15
I3 Journalist 20
I4 Journalist 10
I5 Journalist / media executive 40+
I6 Journalist / foreign
correspondent
21
I7 Journalist / academic researcher 25
I8 Journalist / foreign
correspondent
4
I9 Journalist / academic researcher
/ cyber security advisor and
trainer
25+
I10 Cyber security advisor 5+
I11 Journalist / foreign
correspondent / consultant
37
TABLE 2. DETAILS OF AIB SURVEY RESPONDENTS
Respondent Journalist
specialism
Cyber
security
is a
subject
element
of work
Has
been
the
target
of cyber
attacks
Years
working
as a
journal-
ist
S1 Live
reporting
Yes Yes 38
S2 Technology Yes Yes 29
S3 None Yes Yes 25
S4 Interna-
tional
refugee
crisis
No No 10
S5 Broadcast
journalism
No No 10
“they” has been used to further obfuscate identities. In the
upcoming sections, journalist participants will be referred
to with pseudonymised identifiers beginning with I (inter-
viewees, i.e., I1-I11) and S (journalists surveyed through
the questionnaire disseminated by the AIB, i.e., S1-S5),
as per Tables 1 and 2.
3.2. IoT Threats that Journalists Face
3.2.1. Threats to Information. IoT-related dangers to
journalists can manifest in different ways. We regard
threats to information as threats to the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of raw or analysed information.
Two interviewees, both of whom carry out work advis-
ing and training journalists on security (I9, I10), stated that
their experience indicated that most journalists with whom
they interact are unaware of IoT-related threat models.
I10, a cyber security advisor, responded that journalists
and their organisations were reactionary and tended to
seek help only after being attacked. I10 also stated that
many journalists, “don’t understand the risks of their basic
devices so don’t see how adding more internet-connected
devices expands the attack surface”, and that the threat
was not only to information but in some cases, safety. By
two interviewees’ own admission (I4, I7), additional risk
emanated from reckless behaviour. Even though aware of
the importance of using hardened professional networks
and sanitised devices, they confessed to taking work calls
near to potentially insecure smart-home entertainment sys-
tems. This therefore could threaten the confidentiality of
sensitive data on their work, or their sources.
IoT utility often relies on the same function that
poses a threat to journalists, such as the need for voice-
activated devices to be constantly listening [19]. Only
two interviewees (I1, I4) explicitly mentioned or alluded
to the knowledge that IoT cloud databases (for instance)
were points of vulnerability, either for information loss, or
because they could divulge locational metadata from self-
tracking services. This was surprising given the number of
journalists who use cloud services, as shown in Figure 1;
one interviewee chose not to answer these questions.
Various smart technologies are also already in use (e.g.,
wearables, smart TVs and location tracking devices), even
in this set of journalists who engage in high-risk topics.
Another key point here is that at some stage it may well
be impossible for journalists to remain constantly vigilant
against ambient IoT surveillance.
Figure 1. Devices that interviewees and AIB survey respondents use.
One AIB survey respondent, S1, stated that they have
a strategy of, “keeping sensitive data away from the
devices and if necessary away from the cloud”. Their
answer inferred a mental separation of IoT devices and
the cloud, also signifying a lack of awareness of how
most IoT devices work. That is, IoT devices and the
cloud are coupled; this allows the resource-constrained
IoT device to focus on data collection and presentation,
while the cloud is used for more resource-heavy tasks
such data storage and processing [19]. It was common for
interviewees to emphasise abstractly their awareness that
newer IoT devices are often less secure and do not use
strong encryption, while neglecting the technical details
of other IoT-specific vulnerabilities, such as cloud-reliant
architectures.
Three AIB survey respondents (S2, S4 and S5) explic-
itly expressed their concern that IoT devices pose a threat
to anonymity of sources. However, S5 also noted that
their work is reliant on, “these internet enabled mediums”,
indicating the complexity of the choice to limit their
access to such technologies.
There were a few threat-aware journalists worth high-
lighting. For instance, the concept of “a porous border
between the internet and the tangible world” frightened
I4, as they likened IoT devices to windows in a house: “My
assumption is always that the more devices you have, the
more entry-points for attackers, just like if there are more
windows in your house there are more entry-points for
burglars”. This signals an awareness of how the increased
prevalence of IoT devices expands the attack surface of
an individual and their information environment.
I4 also highlighted a significant issue with devices and
keeping them, and the data they hold, secure. They gave
the example of video game consoles to illustrate their lived
experience of manufacturers being financially motivated
and so abandoning devices (i.e., not releasing patches and
updates, or making additional features incompatible with
previous models). This therefore acts to make the devices
redundant, and eventually insecure; a noteworthy threat
given the pace at which IoT devices are being released
and abandoned.
3.2.2. Legal Threats. Legal threats to journalists occur
when states implement legislation that grants them intru-
sive or sweeping powers. Regarding the IoT and the free
press, these often manifest as data retention laws, national
security loopholes in data protection regulations, the crim-
inalisation of whistleblower and journalistic activities, or
bans on security provisions such as strong encryption.
Ten interviewees admitted or intimated that they are
concerned that IoT devices amass data that can be ac-
cessed by authoritarian or overreaching democratic gov-
ernments with a track record of coercing companies into
divulging this data in the name of national security (all
except I1). Some of these interviewees (I3, I4, I6) explic-
itly mentioned concerns about the risks inherent in poorly
secured IoT devices because of the likelihood of state
surveillance of journalists and a history of attempts to use
overreaching legal mechanisms to conduct leak enquiries.
A perception that most standard IoT devices lack end-
to-end encryption was also the subject of four responses
(I2, I4, I5, I10) regarding legal threats to journalists. Three
participants (I2, I7, I8) also expressed fears regarding
the lack of accountability employed by governments to
justify data retention and anti-encryption laws (such as
those in Australia [20]), and six (I2, I3, I5, I6, I7, I8)
indicated concern about legal loopholes in data protection
laws (such as the “Legitimate Interest” justification in the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)).
I7 noted that their research has unearthed clear worries
in the journalistic communities in countries such as Aus-
tralia. In this case, the concern is linked to Australia’s ban
on strong encryption. In an IoT world, this may mean that
access to the huge quantities of IoT data and metadata can
be gathered and then used by governments to retroactively
build cases against a targeted individual. The result of this
could be prosecution, incarceration or social alienation
such that a journalist would not be able to continue to
effectively operate in their profession.
3.2.3. Physical Threats. Given the cyber-physical nature
of the IoT, IoT threats could be escalated to threats to
the physical security, well-being and safety of journalists
and their sources. I3, who consented to being identified
as a Mexican journalist with experience covering drug
trafficking stories, stated that our interview was the first
time that they had discussed cyber security because, “it’s
not linked enough in countries like mine to survival”.
Their answer elucidated that, traditionally, the perception
of cyber-threats is focused on information, rather than
being linked to potential physical attacks.
While it is true that technologies like smart phones,
laptops and tablets are primarily at risk of loss of data
pertaining to a news piece, novel IoT environments (where
there exist fitness trackers, smart offices, smart light bulbs
and internet-connected vehicles) arguably represent a new
kind of cyber-physical system that has more urgent im-
plications for both the data and physical well-being of
individuals [21]. I7, who has conducted academic research
into the interface of cyber security and journalism, referred
to the belief of free speech and regulation expert, Dr.
Katherine Gelber, that the prevalence of the IoT comes
with global dependence on the IoT for, “production, dis-
semination, the basic tenets of our jobs, so there’s no way
to separate the kinds of attacks that affect information
from those that affect us physically”.
Indeed, I3 noted experiences that had abstractly con-
cerned them, disclosing that, “sometimes the TV switches
on by itself and that’s not normal”, and going on to
express that “everyone is watching you, the web is like
Big Brother”. This is an example of a plausible scenario
in which manipulation of the physical features of an IoT
device stimulate a psychological reaction (fear and stress)
in a journalist, potentially causing subsequent physical
issues—from health responses to erratic or antisocial be-
haviour that further isolates a journalist.
The asymmetrical nature of the threat means that it
is difficult to anticipate threat levels and to know how to
prioritise different defence and source protection strate-
gies. Interviewee I9, who has a role as a cyber security
trainer for journalists, spoke of the commonly held belief
that cyber-threats against journalists come primarily from
states. Their work has revealed that this is often the case,
but also that journalists are frequently subject to cyber-
attacks from the private sector, particularly from banks,
which are highly underestimated in terms of the time and
money they spend hunting whistleblowers through surveil-
lance of journalists. Due to the potent global influence
of these public and private institutions, the interviewee
argued that there is a higher likelihood of targeted cyber-
physical attacks on journalists through the IoT that result
in clandestine consequences. I2 also noted that attribution
of threats is difficult for exactly this reason.
I7 argued that appeals to national security frameworks
to allow states to access IoT contents and metadata could
initiate a slippery slope towards “sedition and treason”, for
which the ramifications are potentially physical and life-
threatening. I10, whose primary role is as a cyber security
advisor, noted that, “in our work it’s very crucial that we
understand that digital security is just one component.
There are also physical and legal threats and other kinds
of attack. It’s pretty common in our work that we see these
be interconnected. Even with the best protections in the
world, if the weakest link in the chain is physical or legal
security, the threat model is too weak”.
I11 also emphasised the real-world, physical impact
of cyber threats. They noted that, “there are so many
unpredictables within the expanding network, specifically
because of IoT, that there is an elevated risk of something
happening in the cyber sphere having a very significant
impact in the real world”. I9 pointed out that the normal-
isation of an increased prevalence of IoT devices could
also lead to populations becoming dependent on their
continued function, which would give a zero-day attack
the power to destabilise societies and the global order in
both kinetic and non-kinetic ways. I10, who also assists
journalists with cyber-attack recovery, further stated that,
“there are a lot of differences between the capabilities of
the adversaries and the journalists being attacked [and]
for someone who doesn’t have a network to support them,
it’s very hard to fight those battles”.
Regarding targeted attacks on individual journalists,
I2 acknowledged that the proliferation of IoT sensors in
urban spaces, both formally and informally creating so-
called ‘smart cities’, would aid adversaries in tracking
and locating journalists, thereby facilitating planned op-
portunities for physical attacks. This could, of course, also
pose a threat to information if devices were subsequently
seized. On a smaller scale, I4 noted that they had fears,
as both a consumer and a journalist, about the physical
effects of the market for basic appliances (e.g., TVs and
fridges) being flooded by IoT devices, thereby making
non-internet-connected devices more expensive and less
accessible and forcing IoT devices to be the new standard.
They were concerned that an attack on their internet
access and/or power supply would drastically affect the
functionality of critical devices.
3.2.4. Threat Vectors. Our media participants (both inter-
viewees and AIB survey respondents) also touched upon
their understanding of IoT threat vectors, naming a variety
of aspects of the IoT that are particularly susceptible to
exploitation. We compared these to the answers from our
34 cyber security expert respondents and compiled the
following two subsections based on all responses.
Cyber security expert survey respondents mentioned
several potential attack vectors for IoT devices, most of
which relate to inadequate security considerations of man-
ufacturers and vendors. These included, “reuse of code
libraries” by developers, an inability to alter passwords,
insecure communication protocols between devices and
servers, a lack of patches and “missing/delayed/inadequate
firmware updates” post-release of products. These are all
evidenced in current research [22].
These expert responses could be divided into two
broad classes: privacy and access control. For access-
control, their responses regarding threats could be classed
as illicit access to information that indirectly facilitates
physical harm, or altering the output of an IoT device
so that it directly or indirectly facilitates or obfuscates
physical harm to its environment and to its user.
Both of these classes of threat could have particularly
destructive consequences if enacted against journalists,
whose role relies on trust—both that they can ensure
source confidentiality, and that they can verify that their
published work is truthful. Despite these considerations,
when journalists’ answers were compared to those from
cyber security expert respondents, our media participants
did not appear to have in-depth knowledge or understand-
ing of threats or threat vectors. While all their concerns
were realistic, we assessed that at least five of them (I1, I3,
I4, I6, I7) lacked detail and were limited in scope. This
suggests that journalists, at least based on our sample,
do not have sufficient understanding of the multitude of
potential threats that can be amplified because of the IoT.
Privacy-related Threats. Many interviewees ex-
panded on two recurrent themes: that IoT devices are
easily compromised as a result of (1) the financial incen-
tive for manufacturers to externalise costs and insufficient
industry standards and regulations (I1, I2, I4, I5, I9, I10,
I11), and (2) systemic subscription to data capitalism (I1,
I2, I4, I5). These points were corroborated by expert
respondents, who noted that both the insecurity of IoT
devices and their intentional data collection present threats
to the public. One expert summed up both themes, saying
“there is a commercial incentive to build a badly set up
panoptican [sic]”.
Another privacy-related issue that was raised by three
respondents (I1, I5, I8) linked to the masses of data
accumulated and transferred by IoT devices: information
leakage and theft resulting from weak or non-existent
encryption and other poor data protection mechanisms,
such as inadequate cloud or application security. Three
AIB respondents (S3, S4 and S5) also explicitly men-
tioned encryption, while S1’s answers did not mention
data transfer and instead seemed to indicate that they try
to physically and virtually isolate their data.
Regarding strategies for the preservation of sources’
integrity and confidentiality in light of the ever-expanding
IoT market, S2 simply said, “individual journalists do
not have viable solutions for this”. For journalists, un-
wanted disclosure of data could endanger their relation-
ships with sources. Notably, one respondent (I7) men-
tioned the “chilling effect” on news reporters as a potential
outcome of increased awareness of the data collection and
analytics resulting from expansion of the IoT.
Access Control-related Threats. Access control
threats can have implications both in the cyber and phys-
ical realms. With respect to the latter, altering the output
of an IoT device can both directly and indirectly cause
physical harm to its environment and users and, one
expert respondent noted, “new emerging physical attack
models [...] are likely to not be known to end users of
these systems”. Our study demonstrated that this is true
of members of the media industry.
Interviewee I10 stated that often attribution is unnec-
essary after cyber-attacks on journalists, from the target’s
perspective, because they can logically link the attack to
the subject of a particular story that they are planning
to publish. Additionally, the constant presence of IoT
technologies and the opacity of their settings would allow
the creation of a dangerous environment even when the
attacker is not physically present. Participants suggested
that there are also scenarios in which cyber and physical
attacks could be concurrent, such as, “people using photos
of valid users’ faces to gain access to their smart locks” or
tampering with burglar alarms, which could then lead to
the purely physical threat of theft. These scenarios clearly
demonstrate how attacks on the IoT could effectively
hamper journalists’ desire to work on stories involving
highly resourced hostile adversaries.
One expert survey respondent pointed out that there
is the greatest threat of physical harm to a number of
people, “where there is a convergence between IoT and
[Operational Technology]/SCADA/[and Industrial Control
Systems], [which] can result in denial of critical ser-
vices or physical damage”. Dependence on such systems
ranges from individual to societal. Examples of the former
include infrastructure devices (e.g., thermostats, gas and
water level detectors and smoke alarms, all of which rely
on accurate and timely sensor reporting), and even the use
of embedded medical devices (e.g., pacemakers, which
one respondent said, “can easily be hacked”).
Other expert survey participants considered targeted
attacks with immediate and overt ramifications, saying
that, “any device which can catch fire, explode, emit
whatever, etc. will be hacked to do so”, and giving more
specific examples, such as, “a heater overheating and
causing a fire (or similar) or turbines being sped up until
they self-destruct”. It is clear that the prevalence of the
IoT has the potential to facilitate massive targeting of
individual journalists or suspected whistleblowers without
likely attribution, which could have a rapid and effective
negative effect on the capabilities of the free press.
3.3. Protection Strategies against IoT Threats
3.3.1. Protective Tools and Methods that Journalists
use to increase their Cyber Security. When asked about
the tools and techniques they employ to defend against
IoT exploitation, every interviewee confirmed that their
primary approach to risk mitigation was to minimise inter-
actions with IoT devices and return to analogue methods
of data collection, communication and storage. Above all,
this recurrence of traditional journalistic habits was noted
as being a crucial component of source protection. I7,
however, acknowledged that it was regressive for news-
gathering, as IoT technologies, “would make the job easier
and give us access to sources who were further away
or evidence that is harder to find”. Worryingly, perhaps
because of a feeling of futility regarding the security of
and protection from IoT devices, some respondents (I1, I3,
I4) admitted that they did not have coherent or relevant
security strategies. Participants I5 and I10, whose work
involves managing or cyber security training numerous
journalists, noted that their organisational risk assessment
procedures do not take into account IoT threats.
3.3.2. Physical Protection Strategies for Journalists.
All ten journalist interviewees (I1-I9, I11) were concerned
that the spread of casual-use IoT devices could remove
the confidentiality of source-journalist interactions. I10
was more attuned to journalists’ vulnerabilities owing
to their work as a civil society cyber security trainer.
Respondents’ techniques for minimising threats resulting
from the IoT can be broadly classified as attempting to
limit their access to the internet, and mainly focused on
disconnecting devices and disabling applications when not
in use. I9 also mentioned taking Faraday cage bags to meet
sources so that, if batteries could not be removed, sources’
devices could be isolated, allowing unintentional audio-
recordings to be muffled and any signals to be blocked.
Interviewees also mentioned using covers over cam-
eras to physically limit the photo-taking functionality of
IoT devices. However, all highlighted strategies were ac-
knowledged to be temporary because of the dangers of
remote access when internet-connection is built into the
functionality of essential devices such as (smart) home
security systems. Interviewees recognised that the main
issue with physical strategies was the same as with all IoT
threats; i.e., journalists cannot always control IoT presence
in the environment where they meet with sources.
Resultantly, some journalists primarily rely on remote
communications methods. However, as previously men-
tioned, interviewees (I4, I7) openly admitted to commu-
nicating important information in the presence of inse-
cure IoT devices. This is likely to render any effort to
use secure remote communications channels redundant, a
problem that will only be exacerbated as the prevalence
of ambient IoT technologies grows.
While not specific to the IoT, there are a few related
security practices worthy of note. For instance, nine in-
terviewees discussed the challenges of finding and ex-
clusively using secure channels for communication with
sources. Two interviewees (I2 and I11) detailed their use
of specific encrypted messaging platforms, such as Signal
and hardened emails, like ProtonMail. Others simply men-
tioned PGP encryption or that they try to rely on encrypted
communication mechanisms more abstractly. However, I5
suggested that it was hard to verify whether these methods
of securing remote communications were sufficient, and
thus also discussed attempts not to put any potentially
source-identifying information into a digital format. I5
further expressed that this, “has made it more difficult to
communicate”. Acknowledging the same challenges, I8
was nevertheless aware that completely avoiding remote
communications channels is unrealistic even if encryption
methods are not fully satisfactory. This highlights a series
of security usability challenges with traditional devices
that can also apply to the IoT.
Many IoT devices now have inbuilt email functionality
(e.g., smart watches and even smart fridges), providing
an additional pivot-point for attackers to access email
correspondence, thereby further lowering confidence in
email security, confidentiality and integrity. Interviewees
differed in their approaches to email security. I11 claimed
that the core of their security regime is to, “assume
that what you’re doing is public communications”, while
I1’s sources only communicate with them using burner
accounts and then the emails are bounced through multiple
accounts, “so the [audit] trail is muddled”.
Additionally, much of the reliance on, or avoidance
of, emails depends on source location and context. For
example, I2 preferred not to communicate via email if the
story is sensitive while, at organisations for which I7 has
worked, “some stories have been shut down completely
if there have been emails” because the channel is “not
considered hygienic and that’s often enough to end a
source-relationship or to kill a story altogether, so it’s a
form of self-censorship”. As a range of IoT devices now
either have access to, or can send, emails, these are of
direct concern to journalists’ work.
3.3.3. Allocation of Responsibility for Journalists’ Cy-
ber Security. Repeated themes from interview respon-
dents included that, “the responsibility to educate journal-
ists about IoT threats lies with news organisations” (I7)
and that often, “the threats come from governments so
we wouldn’t have incentive to listen to their advice” (I7).
Multiple respondents (most of whom preferred to not have
their responses even attributed post-pseudonymisation)
also believed that states and state-affiliated agencies could
not be trusted to inform journalists about IoT threats,
as they were responsible for most instances of targeted
exploitation of journalists’ devices. As a result, proposed
regulation of the IoT industry or reforms of data-related
legislation would likely be met with scepticism by any
journalists who understand technological threats. Instead,
news organisations, journalists’ unions and NGOs were
the suggested parties for education and training of jour-
nalists against IoT threats.
Additionally, many interviewees were sceptical about
involving technology companies in the responsibility of
protection of journalists as they felt that the technology
industry tended to be more aligned with state interests.
However, others, such as I10, felt that, “the first line
should be security experts, developers, making guidelines
so the consumer knows that their device has basic secu-
rity settings embedded”. They pointed out that, “the real
question is whether it’s reasonable to ask a journalist in
distress in an oppressive regime to do all these checks.
Security should be there by default”. The implication from
this interviewee’s perspective is that there is a need for
the development and legislation of standards for the IoT
technology industry.
Furthermore, journalists are increasingly freelancing
or working for underfunded fledgling organisations that
depend on the savvy of individual employees or on the
advice of NGOs. Even I5, a media executive, said, “I
try to follow good and balanced advice from professional
organisations for journalists, like the Electronic Frontier
Foundation”. The EFF is well known for its focus on
privacy and provision of guidance and tools.
I2 and I6 both mentioned that the information that
informs how they maximise their own security or brief
sources on potential threats was collated by the security
teams of organisations for which they work. I10 argued
that it is, “a challenge to update the risk assessment
[used by their organisation, which deals specifically with
advising actors such as journalists on cyber-threats] be-
cause every day more IoT devices are coming out and
even the ones you think you should trust have stories
of being a risk”. They noted that because of the huge
increase in internet-connected devices released, even in
communities that should be more conscious of IoT threats,
risk assessments are clearly lagging behind.
3.4. Comparing Journalists’ Protective Strategies
with Security Recommendations from Experts
Of our 34 expert respondents, 20 (58.8%) felt that
members of the public could not currently opt out of the
use of the IoT in some way. Moreover, 26 (76.5%) felt
that within five years the public—including journalists—
would find it almost impossible to opt out of having
their information vulnerable to IoT devices, even if they
avoided personal ownership of them. This point is critical
for our work as it directly invalidates a primary protective
measure suggested by all interviewees; i.e., the core of
their (often informal) IoT-related security strategies is to
avoid ownership of, and restrict contact with, IoT devices.
This approach is simply not feasible.
Experts suggested few solutions: in the short-term in-
dividuals could focus on efforts to avoid, subvert, or limit
the ability of IoT devices to collect personal information.
These include changing default settings to make pass-
words stronger, activating device firewalls, avoiding public
Wi-Fi, segmenting networks so that critical and non-
critical IoT devices could not interact, and purposefully
inputting incorrect user information in order to impede
accurate data collection. One expert said, “physical and
digital controls of such devices might offer some pro-
tection against privacy/security threats”, which supports
the utility of some mitigations implemented by journalist
respondents, such as the use of camera covers and mech-
anisms to obstruct microphones like Faraday bags.
In the longer-term, expert respondents recommended
better education about the potential threats of IoT devices
(30.8% of respondents), lobbying governments and private
companies to create industry standards around consumer
safety related to IoT devices (26.9%), and a focus on the
need for united public activism in order to push for protec-
tive legislation and education (11.5%) was viewed as vital.
This links to the pivotal point previously touched upon by
I10: the free press is currently staving off near-constant
attacks from highly skilled and well-resourced adversaries.
Therefore, how can society expect individual journalists
to implement both fundamental technical and high-level
cyber security measures against evolving emerging threats
emanating from the IoT? As we have mentioned, when
asked who should be responsible for journalistic cyber se-
curity, media participants largely endorsed an institutional
approach. This suggests that they appreciate, at least in
part, the theme of most expert responses: that IoT threats
are systemic and can only be combated in the long-term
through structural shifts that require coordinated efforts.
4. Discussion
4.1. The Pervasive IoT Threat to Journalists
The cyber-physical nature of the IoT has facilitated
a myriad of novel anticipatory threat models, which can
target the journalist, their devices, or their sources. As
we have seen, use of IoT devices—either knowingly or
unknowingly—can result in the compromise of informa-
tion or sources, and even physical harm. The networked
nature of the IoT means that gaining unauthorised access
to one device can allow an attacker to compromise an
entire smart environment. This factor is exacerbated by
the general poor security of IoT devices [8], which means
that users cannot consistently anticipate or control device
behaviour, including data collection and sharing. Crucially
for journalists, whose jobs rely on public trust, this also
threatens to call into question data integrity as there is a
risk that data could be compromised with, both on a device
and while in transit, which would threaten the ability to
trust that source material is unedited.
Additionally, the availability of data held by multiple
devices can be compromised through DoS attacks target-
ing even one IoT node in the network. This could mean
active censorship, with journalists being locked out of
smart devices or laptops, and denied access to information.
This point becomes even more crucial when we consider
that there have already been efforts that seek to fully
incorporate the IoT in journalism as can be seen in the
2019 Journalism of Things Conference [23]. Potentially
most significantly, unauthorised access to IoT devices
can result in host takeovers and their co-option into a
botnet, which could then be used to enact DDoS attacks
against other, better secured targets, such as entire media
organisations. We covered examples of similar targeted
attacks earlier in this article [12], [13].
Fear of consequences for speaking freely can cause
journalists to self-censor as IoT sensors are integrated into
almost all environments, effectively creating a panopticon
that can identify, track, record and analyse personal data
on a global scale. This is the well-documented “chilling
effect” [24] of constant surveillance on free speech, en-
abled by technological advancement and an erosion of
legislative safeguards for protection of individual privacy
and a free press.
Threats to the physical safety and well-being of jour-
nalists due to the IoT were a primary concern for study
participants. In terms of conducting massive disruption
or destruction operations through IoT exploitation, the
respondents with the most acute understanding of potential
physical threats to journalists through IoT devices (who
all had experience in both journalism and research into
journalists’ security) were also best able to envision threat
models for large-scale kinetic attacks. These attacks could
have a generalised effect or could target people likely to be
in a specific place at a specific time, which could arguably
be used against multiple members of the media at once.
At a more personal level, IoT devices can be targeted
as platform of attack on individual journalists. For in-
stance, wearables or smart appliances could have social
media access [25], [26], which then may be abused with
disproportionate effects for journalists if hackers were
to publicly share false or inflammatory information that
could cause them to be discredited and lead to physical
violence. Regarding altering the output of an IoT device
so that the device directly causes physical harm to its
environment and to its users, there are several threat
models, both current and anticipatory. These range from
crashing autonomous vehicles to taking over smart light
bulbs. The latter could have a number of effects on the
cyber and physical realms, from clandestine user data
exfiltration [26], [27], to their use to trigger epileptic
attacks in photosensitive users [28].
Potential scenarios in which IoT devices can be hi-
jacked are likely to be difficult to corroborate, as Conti
et al.’s research has demonstrated, digital forensics is
difficult in many IoT devices. And, more specifically,
“detecting presence of IoT systems is quite a challenge
considering these devices are designed to work passively
and autonomously [...] in most cases when an IoT de-
vice is identified there is no documented method or a
reliable tool to collect residual evidences from the device
in a forensically sound manner” [22]. This highlights the
significance of the challenge and pervasiveness of the
threat. Another key factor here is the difficulty in assessing
threats and risks in the IoT generally; this is a problem that
is still arguably a unresolved research and practice [9].
Lastly, there is the danger of normalisation of a re-
liance on the remote-access functionality of many IoT
technologies, such as the ability to use one’s phone to
confirm that smart locks are engaged, which could then
be exploited or malfunction. This could cause property
to be physically less secure, as well as affecting users’
mental and emotional well-being by suddenly removing a
safety blanket upon which they had been dependent.
4.2. The Need for IoT Risk Awareness and Pro-
tection Strategies for Journalists
There is a clear need for better strategies to inform
and protect journalists against the increasing number and
variety of IoT threats. According to participants, both
increasing awareness of the threats (many of which we
presented earlier) and supporting protection approaches
(via tools and best practice guidance) are crucial. Key
stakeholders that could play a central role in informing
these strategies include news organisations (thus, employ-
ers), journalists’ unions, and NGOs.
Security-aware journalists can also be an invaluable
source of guidance, and indeed, this seems to be the
way that many security tips are currently being shared
amongst peers. We also saw a number of IoT security and
privacy recommendations provided by experts; including
changing default settings, segmenting networks and better
security education. Once defined, appropriate security and
privacy guidance could be disseminated within well-read
publications such as the UNESCO and Reporters Without
Borders ‘Safety Guide for Journalists’, or the Digital Risk
Assessment guide by the Rory Peck Trust. The EFF may
also be a suitable outlet given it is already being used by
journalists. This would ensure that guidance on how to
address IoT threats is widely accessible.
It was noteworthy, though not surprising given the
participant sample, that most respondents were openly
scathing about the possibility of relying on governments to
improve IoT security and protect journalists from related
threats. This is even as some states, such as the UK [29]
and France [30], have already attempted a push to legislate
for security by design in IoT devices.
The reason for this scepticism is likely due to the
reality that in certain countries, legal provisions can be
used by government agencies and state-affiliated organi-
sations to unmask sources and monitor journalists with-
out the need to justify actions to the public. There is
a disparity between states’ largely unfettered access to
data and the amount of information that journalists can
glean from governments; this is exemplified clearly by the
42% UK government approval rate of Freedom of Interest
requests in 2018 [31]. Access to the vast amounts of
data collected and conveyed by IoT networks could allow
corrupt government bodies and law enforcement agencies
to manipulate information to incriminate journalists and
censor news stories. This reality highlights the need for
other key stakeholders—even those within academia—to
step forward and create, and maintain, IoT risk awareness
and protection strategies for journalists.
4.3. Limitations
There are some limitations that should be noted when
considering the wider implications of our work. Firstly,
we engaged with a constrained sample of individuals, both
within our set of journalists and experts. Moreover, most
of the participating journalists were involved with cyber
security or other high-risk topics which could make them
targets of physical or cyber-attacks by well-resourced
adversaries. This may therefore mean that the threats we
outline are not currently appropriate for all journalists
using IoT devices. This may well change in the future
as IoT devices become more embedded in society.
Secondly, in our cyber security expert survey, we
asked experts about IoT risks and protection strategies for
the general public, rather than for journalists specifically.
This was done in an attempt to prevent experts from
overlooking basic threat models or protection approaches
that would pertain to anyone; journalists are, after all,
also individuals who interact with consumer technologies.
We do, however, acknowledge that not specifically asking
expert respondents about IoT risks to journalists may
have influenced their responses towards underestimation
of risk. Another approach could have been to ask experts
about journalists specifically, or to instead, adopt a staged
process to expert engagement, where threat perceptions
and protection approaches from journalists fed directly
into the design of the expert survey. This could potentially
provide a more robust basis for comparison.
5. Conclusion and Future work
IoT proliferation across homes, workplaces and social
spaces will drastically expand the attack surface surround-
ing all individuals but will be particularly dangerous to
communities that are already highly targeted. In this work,
we determined that one such community, journalists, does
not accurately understand IoT-related threats and are not
adequately protecting themselves.
We did this by: first, interviewing and surveying a total
of 16 members of the media regarding their perceptions
of IoT threats to journalists. Second, surveying 34 cyber
security experts about their knowledge and predictions
regarding whether lay-people can avoid or mitigate IoT
threats and if so, how this can be achieved. Third, com-
paring journalists’ perceived threat models and individual
security behaviours against the expert descriptions of the
IoT threat landscape at present and in future, to assess the
current and anticipated efficacy of journalists’ protective
measures, as well as to determine any potential improve-
ments.
Therefore, given the heightened risk that journalists
and sources face from information threats, our surveyed
experts responses suggest that most mitigation techniques
for current and anticipated IoT threat models will only
work in the short-term. The experts recommended that
the public pursue large-scale structural responses to the
predicted IoT market boom. Again, although the results of
our exploratory study cannot be seen as generalisable, they
have corroborated existing research (e.g., [32]) which also
found that journalists’ conceptions of their own digital
threat models may not be ideal.
There is therefore a clear need for future academic
investigation into socio-technical and policy proposals to
minimise IoT-related threats, particularly to the free press.
Additionally, a continued push by the Human-Computer
Interaction Security academic community for design re-
quirements to be shifted to incorporate better device se-
curity, so that the onus is not on users to be experts in
managing ambient security is crucial. This is especially
true regarding swathes of investigative journalists, whose
work can mean that they have to grapple with targeted
physical and legal threats, in addition to the complex
combination of emergent threat models presented by the
now-ubiquitous IoT.
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Appendix A.
Interview Questions
The aim of this interview is to gain insight into your cyber
security perceptions and practices as a member of the
media industry.
1) In order to help you understand the equipment
and systems we are researching which of these
devices do you use?
• Laptop/desktop computer
• Smart phone/tablet
• Smart TV
• Voice operated assistant, i.e. Alexa,
Google Home etc.
• Wearable smart technology, e.g. fitness
trackers, smart watches
• Cloud Storage
• Location tracking devices, i.e. sat nav,
“find my phone”, “find my keys”
• Smart phone-enabled locks, i.e. remote-
access door locks
• Smart toys, e.g. gaming systems, chil-
dren’s toys, recreational use drones
• Internet-connected cars
• Internet-connected security systems
• Internet-connected HVAC and lighting
systems.
Let us know look at your general journalism
experience.
2) How long have you been a journalist?
3) What motivated you to become a journalist?
4) Do you specialise in any particular journalism
area and within your career what general areas
of journalism have you covered?
5) What motivated you to specialise in this/these
areas?
6) Have you worked in any other jobs other than
journalism within your career?
Let us now turn to cyber security and the risks to
journalists from the IoT and more generally the
“online” world we all now inhabit.
7) Is cyber security something that you consider
while carrying out your day-to-day work?
8) Do you think that cyber security is relevant to
your work as a journalist? If so, how?
9) Is cyber security a subject element of your jour-
nalism?
10) Have you been the target of any digital attacks?
If yes, please give details
11) What distinctions, if any, do you perceive be-
tween the following four categories:
a) “internet-enabled devices”,
b) “internet-connected devices”,
c) “Internet of Things devices” or
d) “smart devices”.
In this interview, the phrase “Internet of Things”
will be used to refer to “smart (i.e. analyti-
cally capable), internet-connected devices that
can share data with each other, creating a ‘net-
work’ of devices”.
12) Do you have any concerns about these sorts of
devices?
13) Are there any of these devices you would not use
and for what reasons?
14) Do you have any privacy concerns about any of
these devices?
15) Would you say your use/views of these devices
are typical of journalists you know?
16) What knowledge do you have of cyber-attacks on
journalists’ devices? Or alternately, what knowl-
edge do you have of cyber-attacks on journalists?
Let us look at what you think about the people
who are attacking journalists.
17) Who would you consider being the perpetrators
of these threats?
18) What do you think are the objectives of cyber-
threat actors who are targeting journalists?
19) How at risk do you feel, as a journalist, with
respect to exploitation of new technologies like
Internet of Things devices?
20) How do you think that threats against journalists
and their sources have evolved with the introduc-
tion and expansion of Internet of Things devices?
21) To what extent do you perceive threats to you
from or via Internet of Things devices?
Let us now look at threats that are not cyber
based.
22) As a journalist, did you experience threats before
Internet of Things devices became very popular?
What sort of other threats did you experience?
23) What other threats were you aware of?
24) Are you concerned with the IoT’s increased po-
tential for attacks to jump from the cyber realm
into the physical world?
25) Are you aware of any combined threats that
involve cyber and non-cyber-attacks?
Let us now move on to your personal cyber
security strategies.
26) Would you say you have personal cyber security
strategies?
27) What are your strategies or tactics for protection
of your Internet of Things devices against cyber-
attacks?/ What are your strategies for defence
against IoT-related threats?
28) Are these specific to your profession or generic,
and in what way are they specific if they are?
29) Has your approach to source protection changed
in light of your understanding of new and evolv-
ing cyber-threats, specifically related to Internet
of Things devices?
30) Do you warn your sources about Internet of
Things device-related risk to their anonymity
and security?
There have been many examples of journalists
being subject to surveillance, censorship and in-
timidation specifically by governments and law
enforcement agencies. Sometimes what would be
discerned as friendly states. These state players
are making greater use of internet-enabled device
exploitation. So, let’s now look at governments
and law enforcement agencies’ Internet of Things
exploitative capabilities as they relate to you and
your work. We are not looking for general or
rumoured issues but ones you have personally
encountered, and we understand the potential
sensitivity of this so it will be kept highly con-
fidential.
31) Given any sensitive topics that you may have
covered, do you feel there is a threat to you from
any country’s governments or law enforcement
agencies?
32) What do you believe the threat is, can you de-
scribe it?
33) If you are willing to say, which countries and
which agencies?
34) If you are not willing, can you say why you are
not willing to identify them?
Looking to the future for journalists.
35) From your knowledge of the industry, do you
think that journalists are becoming more aware
of cyber-threats and effectively protecting them-
selves?
36) Whose responsibility is it to improve journalists’
understanding of threats through IoT devices?
(i.e. the journalists themselves, device suppliers,
media organisations, etc.)
37) Do you need better technical systems as well as
knowledge?
38) Is there an aspect of journalists’ cyber security
that you feel is disproportionately overlooked?
39) Do you have anything you’d like to add or com-
ment on?
Appendix B.
Cyber Security Expert Survey
Please rate the level of your knowledge about cyber
security: [Likert Scale with 5 levels based on knowledge]
1) What do you think are the digital threats associ-
ated with the use of smart devices and the Internet
of Things? [Free text box]
2) What do you think are the physical threats as-
sociated with the use of smart devices and the
Internet of Things? [Free text box]
3) To what extent do you think members of the
general public are able to opt-out of their use
of smart devices and the Internet of Things now?
[Can opt-out/Can’t opt-out]
4) To what extent do you think members of the
general public will be able to opt-out of their use
of smart devices and the Internet of Things in the
future (e.g. over the next 5 years)? [Will be able
to opt-out/Won’t be able to opt-out]
5) What do you think are some of the ways in which
members of the public are able to mitigate digital
and physical threats associated with the use of
smart devices and the Internet of Things? [Free
text box]
